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Abstract
Traditionally, in the United Kingdom and Europe, the surgeon was generally not troubled by litigation from
patients presenting as elective as well as emergency cases, but this aspect of custom has changed. Litigation by
patients now significantly affects surgical practice and vicarious liability often affects hospitals. We discuss some
fundamental legal definitions, a must to know for a surgeon, and highlight some interesting cases.
Review
Expert medical opinion is essential in helping the courts
to assess whether or not the surgeon has exercised a
standard level of care under the circumstances. Depend-
ing on the testimony of those professionals, the court
should decide if the defendant achieved that standard; in
other words: negligent or not [1]. Of course the defen-
dant surgeon standard of care will be compared to the
standard of care in the same surgical discipline [2].
Civil law and clinical negligence
The civil law of negligence is designed to provide com-
pensation for one individual injured by another’s negli-
gence. Negligence can be determined by a threefold test.
Initially, a duty of care must be established, a breach to
that duty has occurred and this has caused harm to that
person [3]. In a surgical setting, it is automatically
assumed that the examining or the operating surgeon
has a duty of care; difficulty arises where a person has
not been accepted as a patient. English law does not
oblige anyone to be a Good Samaritan [4]. When that
standard of care provided by that surgeon falls below
the standard of a “responsible body of medical/surgical
men” and leads to harm to the patient, here the surgeon
is found negligent [5].
The “custom test” is usually applied to assess the sur-
geon’s standard of care. A surgeon is considered to have
deviated from normal practice if it was proved that
there is a usual and normal practice, this practice was
not adopted by the surgeon and the surgeon adopted a
practice in which no professional man of ordinary skills
would have taken [6].
Historically, negligence was recognised as part of the
torts until 1932. Donoghue v Stevenson was related to
the claims of the decomposed remnants of a snail in a
ginger beer bottle. Since then a “duty of care” was estab-
lished; in this case, the duty of the manufacturers of
foods and drinks towards the public [7]. Soon this has
been applied in every single field including surgery.
During the last half a century, Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee laid down the rule when asses-
sing the standard of care in negligence and has been
quoted in almost every clinical negligence case in Eng-
land and Wales.
In 1954, John Hector Bolam who suffered from clini-
cal depression agreed to be admitted to a mental health
institution run by Friern Hospital Management Com-
mittee to undergo electro-convulsive therapy. The pro-
cedure involved initiating a number of medically
controlled seizures. Prior to the procedure, no relaxant
drugs were administered nor were restraints used.
Unfortunately, Mr Bolam flailed about violently and suf-
fered multiple injuries including hip fracture.
Eventually, Mr Bolam started proceedings against
Friern Hospital Management Committee accusing them
of negligence for not administering the relaxants, not
restraining him and failing to provide fully informed
consent as he was never told about the risks involved
with such therapy.
During the proceedings, expert witnesses had con-
firmed that the majority of the medical opinions are not
in favour of using relaxants and applying restraints as
these could actually increase the risks of complications
including fractures. The expert witnesses also elaborated
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that, at that time, it is not a common practice to warn
the patients about small risk of treatment.
During that period, juries were being used for tort
cases in England and Wales and it was their duty to
hold the defendant liable or not. The jury delivered a
verdict in favour of the defendant hospital. Mr Justice
McNair said “I myself would prefer to put it this way,
that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particu-
lar art...At the same time, that does not mean that a
medical man can obstinately and pig-headedly carry on
with some old technique if it has been proved to be
contrary to what is really substantially the whole of
informed medical opinion”. The locus classicus of the
test for the standard of care developed from this
landmark.
The Bolam principle
When there are two or more conflicting surgical opi-
nions with regard to diagnosing or treating a patient,
the Bolam principle is applied. The technical issues
involved with the Bolam principle makes it difficult for
the courts when dealing with negligence compared to
non-medical cases or cases that does not involve health-
care professionals. Although a duty of care can be easily
established but setting the standard of care is very diffi-
cult. It is not difficult to find two surgeons disagree on
the optimal treatment offered to a single patient. Also,
patients arrive to hospital complaining of symptoms; if
developed complications post surgery, it would be diffi-
cult to establish if it is due to substandard care or just a
sequel of their pre-existing symptoms and hence estab-
lish the connection between breach of care and harm
caused by that breach (i.e. a patient suffering from sen-
sory and/or motor weakness as a result of a fracture;
when the fracture is fixed and the symptoms persist, no
one can tell if the symptoms are the result from the
fracture injury or a post surgical complication). Also,
when an intervention or non-intervention is applied and
it was found not to improve the prognosis, would the
surgeon be hold liable if offered no care? (i.e. a surgeon
not performing a laparotomy on a complicated patient
suffering from perforation).
In 1964, the bankers an advertising partnership, Hed-
ley Byrne, was about to undertake some significant
advertising contracts for Easipower Ltd., and wanted to
be sure of their financial security [8]. The bankers tele-
phoned the bank of Heller & Partners Ltd. inquiring
about the financial state and credit record of their client.
Heller vouched for their client’s record but qualified it
by waiving responsibility, stating that the information
was: “for your private use and without responsibility on
the part of the bank and its officials.” Hedley Byrne
relied on that information and entered into a contract
with Easipower which went bankrupt soon afterwards.
Hedley Byrne sued Heller for negligence. The court
found that the relationship between the parties was “suf-
ficiently proximate” as to create a duty of care. Here a
reasonable reliance is created and have been applied,
alongside with Bolam, to assess negligence in advisory
activities (i.e. diagnosis, treatment and prognosis).
In Akenzua v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [9], the police were held liable when they released
a dangerous criminal, to act as an informant, who was
due to be deported. This resulted in the death of a
member of the public. The police had a duty of care
towards the public and given the criminal’s record, the
officials must at least have been reckless and exercising
that power must have known that it was illegal. It was
enough that it was foreseeable that the criminal would
harm somebody. In a similar case, Palmer v Tees Health
Authority, a doctor was accused of negligence to diag-
nose that there was a real, substantial, and foreseeable
risk of a psychiatric out-patient committing serious sex-
ual offences against children; this has lead to the murder
of a four-year-old child. The court struck out the claim
on the grounds that there was no duty of care towards
the child, as any child, at any time, was in the same
danger. Furthermore, as the patient did not suffer from
a treatable mental illness, there was no legal right to
either treat or detain the person [10].
A woman developed an abscess after she had her ear
pierced by a jeweler. Subsequently she sued for negli-
gence as the instruments used were not aseptically ster-
ile. However, the standard of care provided by that
jeweler was the same as any other jeweler. Thus, no
compensation was given; the woman expected a higher
standard of care that may be provided by a surgeon not
a jeweler [11].
In West Midlands Regional Health Authority, 2 con-
sultants (physician and surgeon) instead of waiting for
sputum results for a patient who presented with symp-
toms of tuberculosis, carried out an endoscopic diagnos-
tic surgery to rule out other diseases including cancer.
The patient, who was subsequently diagnosed with
tuberculosis, suffered paralysis of the left vocal cords fol-
lowing damage to the left recurrent laryngeal nerve. The
decision of the physician and the surgeon to proceed
was said by their expert peers to be reasonable in the
circumstances [12].
A casualty officer in Chelsea & Kensington Hospital,
being unwell and failing to attend, gave instructions to
discharge three patients who attended earlier to the
emergency department. One patient died, later, due to
arsenical poisoning, a rare cause of death. The hospital
was found negligent in failing to examine the patient
but not the death of that patient [13]. The court was
Jerjes et al. Head & Neck Oncology 2011, 3:52
http://www.headandneckoncology.org/content/3/1/52
Page 2 of 6
satisfied that even if the defendants had performed their
duty of care and admitted the deceased to their hospital,
he would still have died of arsenic poisoning five hours
after being admitted, and that he therefore suffered no
loss as a consequence of the breach of duty complained
of [14].
When an overtired or overworked surgeon has mista-
ken a diagnosis or commits a surgical error, he/she is
liable to the injured patient. The lack of resources often
causes surgeons to work for excessive continuous hours
and in one judgment, a judge said “the lack of resources
should be taken into account in medical negligence
claims” [15]. But this was later rejected in Brooks v
Home Office [16].
In another case, a mother in a high-risk pregnancy
had been in labour for 22 hours. The senior registrar
applied forceps to assist the delivery. The newborn suf-
fered severe brain damage. The surgeon was not found
negligent as the standard of care did not fall below that
of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances [17].
A neurosurgeon was not found negligent when he
failed to inform the patient of a very low risk (1%) of
paraplegia following cervical cord de-compression in
which the patient subsequently underwent and suffered
this rare complication [18]. It was argued that the doc-
tor doesn’t need to provide information about possible
remote side effects. Lord Scarman stated “I have to say
that a judge’s ‘preference’ for one body of distinguished
professional opinion to another also professionally dis-
tinguished is not sufficient to establish negligence in a
practitioner whose actions have received the seal of
approval of those whose opinions, truthfully expressed,
honestly held, were not preferred”. This provided strong
endorsement to the Bolam principle. Also, although the
court might prefer one body of surgical opinion to
other, but this doesn’t mean that a surgeon who adopted
that opinion can found to be negligent.
On a balance of probability, a judge has rejected the
appeal in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority
[19]. A 20-year-old and after failing to diagnose the
extent of his hip injuries 7 years ago, exhibited defor-
mity of the hip joint and permanent disability. The case
was rejected on the grounds that even if the diagnosis
had been made correctly, there was still a 75% risk of
the plaintiff’s disability developing, but that the medical
staff’s breach of duty had turned that risk into an inevit-
ability, thereby denying the plaintiff a 25% chance of a
good recovery, and hence only 25% of the full values of
damage were granted.
In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [20], a
junior doctor administered excessive oxygen to a prema-
ture child during the post-natal care; this lead to blind-
ness. The medical experts provided evidence that there
are five further causes that might have lead to blindness.
The Lords, therefore, found that it was impossible to
say that it had caused, or materially contributed, to the
injury and the claim was dismissed.
When it comes to trainees, the courts make no allow-
ance when assessing liability. In a number of cases
courts has rejected that junior doctors are inexperienced
and mistakes can happen. According to the courts,
junior doctors are required to adhere to the same stan-
dard of care as their senior colleagues; and also seek
senior opinion when required. At that stage the term
“team negligence” was introduced. In Jones v Manchester
Corporation [21], the Court of Appeal did not accept
the evidence that the inexperience of the doctor has
lead him to administer excessive dose of anaesthesia
which lead to the patient’s death. One point was made
clear in this case, a junior doctor, who, recognising his
inexperience, calls in his consultant will have discharged
his duty. Responsibility in the law will move to the
consultant.
When it comes to continuous professional develop-
ment, a doctor is expected to be up to date with all the
recent developments in the field, also need to be aware of
all the abandoned techniques or therapies. However,
where to draw the line, is always debatable. A doctor was
found guilty when a patient developed brachial palsy fol-
lowing blood transfusion. The evidence was based on a
publication in a prominent journal 6 months previously.
It was an interesting case where a judgment was based
on a published article. Wisely, the Court of Appeal over-
turned the case suggesting that it would be impossible to
expect every doctor to read every single published article
[22]. It used to be acceptable when a surgeon says that
his/her current surgical practice was the acceptable prac-
tice when he/she started the training 10-20 years ago, for
example. Nowadays this surgeon can be found negligent
if its current practice is not up to date.
A patient in the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital who had
been born with a spinal problem had her spinal cord
totally severed, following the operation, leaving her para-
plegic. Mr. Justice Reynolds found that a major issue
was the relationship between the hospital and the sur-
geons, that the hospital was not liable or vicariously
liable but that the surgeons who performed the opera-
tion were negligent [23].
The principle of the so-called “super-specialist” was
well protected by the Bolam principle when a spinal sur-
geon was not found negligent after operating on a
patient who eventually sustained paraplegia. The major-
ity of the evidence provided by his colleagues confirm
that the operation represent high-risk and has been
abandoned. Only 11 surgeons in the whole country were
using such approach [24].
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The Bolitho principle
Few attempts were employed by the courts to move
away from the Bolam principle (or test) but in almost
every case higher courts have overruled their appeals. In
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, the claim
relates to treatment received by Patrick Nigel Bolitho at
St. Bartholomew’s Hospital on 1984 when he was two
years old. Patrick suffered catastrophic brain damage as
a result of the bronchial air passages becoming blocked
leading to cardiac arrest. The doctor who, negligently,
failed to attend said that she would not have intubated
the boy even if she would have attended as she weighted
risks against benefits; at that time it was agreed that the
only course of action to prevent the damage was to have
the boy intubated. Six expert witnesses were brought to
testify, in which five said they would have carried the
procedure and one disagreed. By the end of the trial it
was common ground, first, that intubation so as to pro-
vide an airway in any event would have ensured that the
respiratory failure which occurred did not lead to car-
diac arrest and, second, that such intubation would have
had to be carried out, if at all, before the final cata-
strophic episode [25].
The House of Lords held that there would have to be
a logical basis for the opinion not to intubate. This
means that a judge will be entitled to choose between
two bodies of expert opinion and to reject an opinion
which is ‘logically indefensible’. This has been inter-
preted as being a situation where the court sets the law
for clinical negligence.
Sometimes certain conduct might add to the risk of
injury, if the defendant engages in such conduct in
breach of a common law duty, and if the injury is the
kind to which the conduct related, then the defendant is
taken to have caused the injury even though the exis-
tence and extent of the contribution made by the breach
cannot be ascertained. In McGhee v National Coal
Board [26], the House of Lords held that where a breach
of duty has a material effect on the likelihood of injury
then the subsequent injury will be said to have been
caused by the breach. McGhee, who was employed to
clean out brick kilns, sued his employer for negligence
for failing to provide the proper washing facilities to
prevent the outbreak of dermatitis from the accumula-
tion of coal dust on his skin. The issue before the
House of Lords was whether the failure to provide the
washing facilities had caused the rash. Lord Reid stated:
“The medical evidence is to the effect that the fact that
the man had to cycle home caked with grime and sweat
added materially to the risk”.
Discussion
The Bolam principle considered until now to be a good
screening modality for standard care. Practice in surgery
has not reached the stage of scientific reliability where
answer can be given. With Bolam, a test can be vali-
dated when two or more genuine and respected reviews
are held, as the standard of care is a matter of medical
judgment. However academics believe that it seems to
overprotect surgeons and also allows them to set their
own standards.
The main criticism to the Bolam principle as a
descriptive test of what is actually done, while negli-
gence cases usually on what should be done. The defini-
tion of a competent body of opinion is imprecise and
can legitimize marginal practices. Solicitors often find it
to be inconsistent with negligence principles generally.
The most essential component in negligence is to
prove that the surgeon failed under the circumstances
to provide an acceptable standard care to his/her
patient. The circumstances vary in every single case and
it is almost impossible to compare two cases; also every
surgeon would react differently to the circumstances
depending on the level of experience, knowledge, train-
ing and school of thought. The Bolam principle is one
way to show that the care provided was standard or
substandard. The Bolam principle has been perceived as
being reliant on the testimony of the professionals sup-
porting the defendant. The Bolitho case by implication
imposes that the standard proclaimed must be justified
on a logical basis taking into consideration the risks and
benefits. The shift from the Bolam to the Bolitho
approach allowed the court to reach its own conclusions
based on logic rather than knowledge after taking more
enquiring stance to test the medical evidence offered by
both parties in litigation.
In Penney v East Kent Health Authority, three women
developed cervical cancer after a negative screening test.
Despite that the claimants’ slides showed abnormal cells,
they were labeled as normal. The health authority
defence was that these findings (abnormal cells) are dif-
ferently interpreted and this should be decided accord-
ing to the Bolam test. The trial judge and the Court of
Appeal agreed that the “logical” act by a reasonable per-
son is to label these slides as borderline so Bolitho was
preferred over Bolam [27].
It was felt that judges used to be reluctant to find sur-
geons guilty of negligence and many judges used to
believe that surgeons needed to be protected from this
threat. Lord Denning, as a supporter of the medical pro-
fession, in the case of Hatcher v Black [28] described
negligence as a “dagger in the doctor’s back”. It can be
always argued that health professionals are human and
mistakes and poor practice are unavoidable. Recently,
there has been marked increase in the compensation
claims against NHS hospital and surgeons. The old
belief that surgeons should not be hold liable for their
mistakes has now changed [29].
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Courts cannot decide whether a surgeon was negligent
without expert evidence of “accepted surgical practice”
[30]. In any profession, especially in surgery, genuine
differences of opinion may arise. It can be found that
both sides of debate advance medical reasons for their
respective judgment. Also, if deviation from accepted
clinical practice is considered to be negligence; this
might reflect badly on the advances in all the surgical
fields; this suggests that clinicians will not be able to
apply an original technique or surgical procedure with-
out facing suspension and a case of negligence. Lord
Clyde in Hunter v Hanley said that “such thing could be
disastrous and severely affect the progress in medical
science” [31].
The Compensation Act 2006 was passed as something
of a knee-jerk reaction to much publicised claims of a
“compensation culture”. Section 1 of the Act states that
“a court considering a claim in negligence or breach of
statutory duty may, in determining whether the defen-
dant should have taken particular steps to meet a stan-
dard of care (whether by taking precautions against a
risk or otherwise), have regard to whether a requirement
to take those steps might- (a) prevent a desirable activity
from being taken at all, to a particular extent or in a
particular way, or (2) discourage persons from undertak-
ing functions in connection with a desirable activity”. It
is unlikely for this act to have any effect on the clinical
negligence claims, unless judges decided to accept the
claims about defensive medicine and surgery, and deter-
mine that allowing physicians and surgeons to be sued
damages national healthcare [32].
There has been a recent move to the use of guidelines
and deviation from them as a proof of negligence [33].
This has been promoted by changes to “The Civil Pro-
cedure” [34] which promotes expedience and the use of
guidelines even if in the changed rules for disclosure.
Unfortunately, as yet many of the guidelines produced
by agencies such as NICE have been shown to be flawed
even to the extent that they could not be implemented
locally because of lack of resources or even patient
applicability. NICE has recently been forced to publically
apologise for its imposed health inequality for cancer
suffers. Even so the House of Lords in “Bland” [35] and
The Court of Appeal in “Burke” [36] regarded guidelines
as the extension of the Bolam Principle. Several guide-
lines have been radically changed because of bias of
information selection and committee makeup, with each
deviation leading to a new raft of negligence claims. The
Bolitho test of logic is preferable in treatment selection
even if somewhat arbitrary; this is a further move away
from the Bolam Principle. It is believed that guidelines
will prevent doctors from implementing professional
judgment when dealing with their patients; [37] in the
field of surgery, every patient should be treated on their
own merit.
An uncertainty is not made more certain by the impo-
sition of an arbitrary logic; similarly a procedure that is
subject to variation is difficult to test against general
guidelines which are meant to be adapted to the indivi-
dual circumstances of the patient.
The question of professional negligence is problematic
because, to a certain degree, each surgical discipline sets
its own standards and may to that extent be considered
“self-regulating”. It is difficult to strike a balance in law
between the interests of the professionals and those who
rely on them. Courts believe that Bolitho, although wel-
comed, is being used mainly in a “back-up” position
[38].
A situation may arise whereby a surgeon has per-
formed many procedures but has through a fortunate
chance not had occasion to have a patient who has
experienced a specific complication from these proce-
dures. Would the surgeon be correct in quoting their
own quite valid risk figures and percentages without
quoting the chance complication that none of the
patients treated has experienced but which on average
may occur for another surgeon. Eventually the compli-
cation may happen but how does a wise surgeon inform
the patient in a meaningful way?
In summary, healthcare at best is empirically impre-
cise and Bolam provides an ideal compromise to allow
for this uncertainty. Unfortunately attempts to regulate
surgical practice by ‘outside agencies’ using an idealistic
paradigm has led to the ‘Bolitho view’ and further judg-
ments which although more legally simplistic to apply is
based on constructs of logic and the vagaries of the vox
populare that may not withstand the test to time. Unfor-
tunately, until the occasion of the reasonable and
unbiased expert witness, many arguments which suggest
logic can be critically but subtly flawed, however to rely
upon this “expert” evidence may be fallacious and for a
court to decide upon two contrary logical arguments
may deviate even further from the truth and eventually
justice.
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